Free will-II

Scottus Eriugena. Treatise on divine predestination.

It is very firmly to be maintained, then, that no sin, that is, no evil deed, and no punishment for it, has its origin elsewhere than in the individual will of man who misuses the freedom of choice. And the true reason does not find it to be otherwise. In order to demonstrate this, use must be made of the argument by comparison. If the will is according to nature human, from this it is very foolish to doubt, and no one does doubt, that it is not the highest will of all, this principally from the evidence that it is changeable. For if it were the highest of all, how could it be changeable? It is not, then, the highest. But since we see that it shares in the highest reason, we cannot doubt that it is a rational substance. Secondly, if rational nature deservedly takes a precedence over irrational, it follows that a changeable rational nature is inferior to an immutable rational one, but greater than an irrational and changeable one. We must, then, believe, that the divine will, the highest of all, in no way has either urged the rational will, which it created, to sin, or compelled it to sin. But how could an irrational will, like that of the animals, overcome a will better than itself, especially as it cannot sin itself, being devoid of reason? How could it have either urged or compelled to sin a will stronger than itself, one indeed making use of reason? There remains on a par with a will, if such exists, which is either free from vice or is vitiated. But if it were to be free from vice, by what means can it either urge or enforce vicious actions in a will equal to itself? For no will that is free from vice effects vice in another will. But if it is vitiated it is not on a par with the human will before sin. For every will free of corruption is better than one not free of it. The conclusion is that every opportunity for evil doing and all punishment for it is in man’s own will.